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Abstract
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is
uniquely selected on the long run by the best response dynamics with mutation. Bergin
and Lipman (1996) qualiﬁed this result by showing that for a given population size the
evolutionary process can select any strict Nash equilibrium if the probability of choosing
a nonbest reply is state-dependent. This paper shows that the unique selection of the risk
dominant equilibrium is robust with respect to state dependent mutation in local interaction
games. More precisely, for a given mutation structure there exists a minimum population
size beyond which the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. Our result is driven
by contagion and cohesion among players, which exists only in local interaction settings
and favors the play of the risk dominant strategy. Our result strengthens the equilibrium
selection result of evolutionary game theory.
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Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) showed that the risk dominant equilibrium
is uniquely selected for global interaction games with mutation. When a group of agents play
coordination games among themselves and there is a small mutation probability that each agent
may choose a sub-optimal strategy, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected uniquely as the
probability of mutation vanishes to zero. While the strength of the result follows from the parsi-
mony of the model, Bergin and Lipman (1996) showed that the result crucially depends on one
of the few parameters of the model. In particular they criticized the result in that the equilibrium
selection result may be overturned in favor of the payo dominant equilibrium if state depen-
dent mutation is allowed. If agents are more cautious when playing the payo dominant action
than the risk dominant action and hence they make less mistakes or less experimentations, the
equilibrium playing payo dominant action remains the long-run equilibrium.
This paper reexamines their argument for equilibrium selection in the context of local inter-
action games. We show that for a given mutation structure there exists a minimum ﬁnite pop-
ulation size beyond which the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. This is because
the equilibrium selection turns out to depend on the size of the population in local interaction
games. This is also the reason why we obtain a dierent result from that of Bergin and Lipman
(1996). They take the population size as given, and then pick up a mutation structure which
selects some long run equilibrium. In contrast, we ﬁx the mutation structure ﬁrst, then we set
the population size suciently high so that the risk dominant equilibrium is selected. Since
the equilibrium selection is independent of the population size in global interaction games [see
the motivating example in Bergin and Lipman (1996)], it does not make a dierence in such
an environment which parameter is regarded as ﬁxed relative to the other one. In contrast, it
matters for local interaction games.
The nature of our result is easiest to understand in the model where each agent plays against
the nearest neighbors on a circle of size N as in Ellison (1993). Assume that the mutation
rates for each action choices are not uniform, and speciﬁcally the payo dominant action has
mutation rate smaller than the risk dominant action by some order. Observe that if there are
two adjacent sites playing the risk dominant action, they continue to play the risk dominant
action independent of the strategy proﬁle played in the remainder of the circle. Moreover two
additional sites next to the two adjacent sites who are already playing the risk dominant strat-
egy switch to the risk dominant action in the next period in the absence of mutation because
contagion takes place deterministically. Thus, transition from the conﬁguration playing payo
1dominant strategy everywhere to that playing risk dominant strategy everywhere takes just 2
mutations. In contrast, transition from the conﬁguration playing risk dominant strategy every-
where to that playing payo dominant strategy everywhere require N simultaneous mutations.
The cohesion between players playing the risk dominant strategy makes it dicult to break that
group. The number mutations required to make transition to the state playing risk dominant
strategy everywhere is independent of the population size while the transition to the state play-
ing the payo dominant strategy everywhere depends on the population size. Therefore, if the
population is big enough, the latter transition probability can be made much smaller than the
former one taking the mutation structure across the two strategies as given. So that the risk
dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run even even if the mutation probability
is state dependent.
Recently many attentions were paid to the local interaction games. For instance Anderlini
and Ianni (1996), Blume (1993, 1994, 1995), Lee and Valentinyi (2000) and Morris (2000) ex-
amined the issue of equilibrium selection in local interaction games with and without mutation.
Most notably Ellison (2000) addresses the issue of contagion dynamics and mutation.1 He de-
velops a powerful technique for the determination of the long-run distribution of a stochastic
process when there are many limit states in the system. In contrast we focus narrowly to 2
dimensional local interaction games which has a lot of limit states. In doing so we ﬁnd that
the selection of risk dominant equilibrium is not mainly due to the step-by-step evolution. In
particular the saving in the waiting time emphasized in Ellison (2000) does not necessarily fa-
vor the propagation of risk dominant strategy since the step-by-step evolution which induces
the saving may facilitate the transition from the risk dominant strategy to the payo strategy
as much as the opposite. It is the contagion dynamics which provides huge saving in the num-
ber of mutations required for the transition from payo dominant strategy to the risk dominant
strategy.
Since Bergin and Lipman (1996) suggested a careful examination of the implication of the
state dependent mutation, more attention has been paid to the issue. For instance van Damme
and Weibull (1998) examined the decision making process associated with the cost of mistake.
They concluded that the introduction of the state dependent mutation does not overturn the
standard equilibrium selection result since the concern for the cost of mistake favors the muta-
tion toward the risk dominant strategy. Similarly, Young (1998) one can relax the uniformity
of mutation in a plausible way without changing the stochastically stable outcome. Although
reﬁning the decision making process is an important issue, we believe that it is at least as im-
1We provide more discussion on the relationship of our result to his approach later
2portant to prove the robustness of the equilibrium selection result for a certain environment. In
particular, the evolutionary approach deliberately avoids reﬁning the decision making process
since a result obtained by reﬁnement would be susceptible to a perturbation in the opposite way.
In the absence of a theory which guarantees the validity of a particular reﬁnement, establishing
the robustness in a certain environment seems consistent with the general spirit of the research
in the area.
The rest of the paper organizedas follows. Section 2 describes a 2-dimensional environment
of local interaction. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper. This section starts with a
renormalization argument, then characterizes the stochastically stable outcome using a series
of lemmas and propositions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Local Interaction Game
2.1 A framework of local interaction
There is a population of N2 players located on a 2 dimensional torus (N) = Z2 \ [0;N)2 for
N  1 (mod N). A player with address x 2 (N) interacts with her nearest neighbors. The set
of neighbors for the origin is deﬁned by N  fy : kyk = 1g where kyk  (jy1j + jy2j), and the set
of neighbors for player x is given by x + N  fy : kx   yk = 1g; namely the translation of N by
x.
There are two pure strategies fA; Bg for player x 2 (N). Let st : (N)  ! fA; Bg be a map
which represents the strategy chosen by player x at time t. We characterize the dynamics of the
population in terms of the set of players playing A, thus
S t = fx : st(x) = A; x 2 (N)g: (1)
2.2 Coordination game
Consider the 2  2 coordination game given in Table 1. We require that a > c, d > b and
(a c) > (d b) so that both (A;A) and (B; B) are Nash equilibria and (A;A) is the risk dominant
one.
All players play the game simultaneously over discrete times. The feature of local interac-
tion is reﬂected in that the payo of each player depends on the strategy played by herself and
3A B
A a;a b;c
B c;b d;d
Table 1: Coordination Game
everyone in the neighborhood. The payo of player x playing strategy A in period t is given by
ut(x;A) = b + (a   b)
jS t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj
; (2a)
where j  j denotes the cardinality of a set. Similarly, the payo of player x playing strategy B
in period t is given by
ut(x; B) = d + (c   d)
jS t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj
: (2b)
In the absence of mutation, players are assumed to play the myopic best-response: player x in
period t + 1 chooses
st+1(x) = argmax
fA;Bg
fut(x;A);ut(x; B)g: (3)
Thus player x plays A in period t + 1 if
jS t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj

d   b
(a   c) + (d   b)
 : (4)
Since (A;A) is the risk dominant equilibrium,  < 1=2.
2.3 State Dependent Mutation
We introduce mutation into the model; the agent may make a mistake or an experiment and
thus choose a strategy at random with a small probability. In particular we consider a stochas-
tic process fS "
tgt0 which is derived from fS tgt0, allowing for random noise due to mutation.
In the conﬁguration of the noise structure, we explicitly recognize the possibility of the state
dependent mutation probability.
To ensure state dependence on the one hand, but independence across players and time, we
use the following construction. Let
p : (N)  [0;1]  fA; Bg
(N)  fA; Bg  ! [0;1]
4be a map which assigns two non-negative numbers, p(x;";S;A) and p(x;";S; B); to player x
representing the probability of mutation to A and B, respectively. We require that p(x;";S;A)+
p(x;";S; B) 2 [0;1]:
Deﬁne t(x) as the collection of independent random variables uniformly distributed on
[0;1] for all t and x 2 (N), and deﬁne Xt as:
Xt(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
A if t(x)  p(x;";S "
t 1;A)
B if t(x)  1   p(x;";S "
t 1; B)
0 otherwise.
(5)
Xt(x) is a collection of random variables which are independent across players and time. The
speciﬁcation also ensures that the mutation probability depends on the state of the population,
the location of the agent, and so on. In particular, the state of the population includes the state
of agent x so that the mutation probability may be dierent depending on whether the agent
plays A or B and one strategy may be chosen with a higher mutation probability than the other
one.
We make the following assumption about the mutation structure.
Assumption 1 The mutation probability satisﬁes:
1. lim"!0 p(x;";S; ) = 0 for all x 2 (N) and S  (N), and
2. there exist (A) > 0 and (B) > 0 such that
inf
x2(M);S(N)
p(x;";S;A) = "
(A) (6a)
sup
x2(M);S(N)
p(x;";S; B) = "
(B): (6b)
The ﬁrst assumption is standard. The second one requires that the mutation probabilities are
uniformly bounded, i.e. "(A) and "(B) are the lower bound and upper bound on the probabil-
ity that an agent chooses strategy A and B as a consequence of mutation, respectively. This
assumption is not more restrictive than other similar assumptions used in the literature (see El-
lison (2000) and Young (1993) for example). Note that "(B) can be of a lower order than "(A),
i.e. B can be adopted more frequently than A. Hence this is compatible with the environment
for which Bergin-Lipman’s result holds for a given population size.
5Using the construction, the transition rule for the process fS "
tgt0 can be formally written as
S
"
t+1 = (S
"
t) 
(
x 2 (N):Xt+1(x) = 0;
jS "
t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj
 
)
[fx : Xt+1(x) = Ag (7)
Denoting the event where everybody plays A by ~ A, we are interested in the long-run proba-
bility of the event ~ A:
"(~ A) = lim
t!1Pr(S
"
t = (N)): (8)
In particular our main goal is to characterize "(~ A) as " # 0.
3 Best Response Dynamics with State Dependent Mutations
Our analysis of the long-run distribution of the population consists of two steps. First, we
construct a new process which satisﬁes some sample path inequality with respect to the original
process so that it implies a certain distributional inequality.2 Second, we compute the long-run
distribution for the new process and deduce the properties of the limiting distribution of the
original process using the distributional inequality. The main beneﬁt of the stepwise approach
is the analytical convenience the new process provides.
3.1 Renormalization and Coupling Argument
Suppose that N is even.3 Let (M) be a torus where M  N=2, and assign to each y 2 (M) a
set of four players from the original torus (N) by
H(y) =
n
x 2 (N) : xi 2 f2yi;2yi + 1g;i = 1;2;y 2 (M)
o
: (9)
We call y and x 2 H(y) a team and a team member, respectively. We shall also refer to the
population of teams as the renormalized population. Let zt : (M)  ! fA; Bg be a map which
represents the state of team y at time t; which will be deﬁned shortly. As before, we characterize
the dynamics of the population in terms of the set of teams playing A, thus Z"
t = fy : zt(y) = Ag.
We construct an initial conﬁguration Z"
0, and a transition rule such that that if the state of a team
is A, then all of its team members play A in the original population.4
2This is called the coupling technique. See Aldous and Fill (1999, Chapter 14).
3We discuss later what happens if N is odd.
4On the other hand we do not require if a team plays B, all members play B.
6First, we deﬁne the initial state for the renormalized process. At time zero, a team is said to
play A if all of its members in the original population play A; otherwise it plays B. Formally,
Z"
0 is deﬁned by
Z
"
0 = fy : z0(y) = Ag: (10)
where
z0(y) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
A if s0(x) = A 8x 2 H(y)
B otherwise.
(11)
Note that
fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Z0g  S 0: (12)
Thus, the set of agents playing A estimated with the teams in the initial period is a subset of the
set of agents playing A in the original population.
First, we construct the transition rule for the renormalized process without mutation such
that the condition fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Ztg  S t (if a team plays A, all of its members in the original
population play A) satisﬁed for all t  0. Observe that if all members of a team play A in the
original population, then the best response for all team members is A. Therefore, if a team plays
A, it will never adopt B in the absence of mutation. Moreover, let
Gi(y) = fy   ei;y + eig; for i = 1;2 where e1 = (1;0) e2 = (0;1):
That is, Gi(y) represents the two neighbors of team y in coordinate direction i. It is easy to see
that if a team playing B encounters two other teams all of whose members are playing A in
two dierent coordinate directions, then all members of the team adopts A in at most 3 periods
under the original process (see Figure 1 where the reference to the time indicates the period
when the agent adopts A).
For future reference we summarize the transition rule for the renormalized process in the
absence of mutation by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Contagion) In the absence of mutations
1. if a team y plays A, it never adopts B,
2. if a team y has at least one member playing B, all of its members adopt A ifGi(y)\Z"
t , ?
for i = 1;2.
Second, we construct a random variable representing mutations for the renormalized popu-
lation using the random variable representing mutations for the original population. We do it in
7Figure 1: Propagation mechanism for the teams with no mutation
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 agents playing A in period t
two steps. Let
t(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
A if t(x)  "(A)
B if t(x)  1   "(B)
0 otherwise:
(13)
Our condition ensures that the event ft(x) = Ag implies fXt(x) = Ag, and fXt(x) = Bg implies
ft(x) = Bg. Next, let Yt(y) be a random variable with values
Yt(y) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
A if 3t(x) = A 8 x 2 H(y)
0 if n(x) = 0 8 x 2 H(y) and n = 3t   2;3t   1;3t
B otherwise
(14)
In words fYt(y) = Ag is the event in which all team members mutate to A in period 3t, fYt(y) = 0g
is the event that no mutation occurred during the period 3t   2;3t   1;3t. Finally, fYt(y) = Bg
is the event that at least one team mutated to B during the period 3t   2;3t   1;3t, and all team
members do not mutate to A in period 3t.
There are two important facts about Yt(x). First, the construction of Yt(x) and Lemma 1 en-
sure that the stochastic process for the renormalized population is a Markov process. Secondly,
the timing for the renormalized population is dierent from that of the original population. As
we can see on Figure 1, it takes three periods under the original process that all team members
adopt A. Therefore the clock for the renormalized population ticks slower, i.e. three periods un-
der the original process correspond to one period under the renormalized one. This is reﬂected
8by the timing convention used in the deﬁnition of the random variable Yt(x).
We can use Assumption 1 to provide bounds on the events that a team mutated to A or to B.
Setting ¯ (A) = 4(A), we obtain
Pr(Yt(y) = A) = "
¯ (A): (15a)
Moreover, a team mutates to B with probability at most 12"(B). For small " there is a ¯ (B) such
that this probability is at most "¯ (B), i.e.
Pr(Yt(y) = B)  "
¯ (B) (15b)
Finally, after the construction of the transition rule without mutations, and deﬁning the
random variable representing mutations for the teams, we can construct the transition rule for
the renormalized process with mutation
Z
"
t+1=	(Z
"
t ) 
n
y < Z
"
t : Yt+1(y) = 0;Gi(y) \ Z
"
t , ?;Yt+1(u) = 0;u 2 Gi(y) i = 1;2
o
[
n
y 2 Z
"
t : Yt+1(y) = 0
o
[
n
y 2 (M) : Yt+1(y) = A
o
:
(16)
Equation (16) can be decomposed to three transition mechanisms, contagion, cohesion, and
mutation. Contagion is represented by the ﬁrst bracket. If team y is playing B at time t, and
meets two other teams playing A in two dierent coordinate directions, it chooses A at time
t + 1. This transition is called contagion. Since we require that neither team y nor any of
the two other teams mutate at time t + 1, the construction in (14) implies that no members of
any of these three teams mutated in the original process at 3t +1;3t +2;3(t +1). Therefore, all
members of team y make a transition from B to A during 3t+1;3t+2;3(t+1). Consequently, all
players in these three teams plays A at time 3(t + 1) in the original process. Cohesion captured
by the second bracket. It indicates that a team playing A continues with the same choice in
the absence of mutation. Since Yt+1(y) = 0 implies that no member of team y mutates during
3t + 1;3t + 2;3(t + 1), all members of team y play A at time 3(t + 1) in the original process.
Mutation is represented by the last bracket. Again, the construction of the mutation for the
teams ensures that if team y mutates to A at time t + 1, so does all of the team members at time
3(t + 1) in the original process.
All three mechanisms are inherited from the original population, renormalization makes
cohesion explicit and simpliﬁes the way contagion works. The above decomposition also high-
lights the potential advantage of the renormalized process over the original one. Transition
9from B to A can take place both in the presence and the absence of mutation in the original
process. In contrast, transition from B to A takes place only as a consequence of mutation in the
renormalized process. This simpliﬁes the derivation of the limit distribution of the renormalized
process.
It follows from our discussion above that our contraction ensures the desired relationship
between the original and renormalized process as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The process fZ"
t gt0 governed by the transition rule (16) and starting from the
initial condition (10) satisﬁes
fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Z
"
t g  S
"
3t: (17)
for all t.
Proposition 1 in turn implies an important consequence for our analysis captured by the follow-
ing statement.
Proposition 2 If lim"!0 "(~ A) = 1, then lim"!0 "(~ A) = 1 where "(~ A) is the long run proba-
bility of the event where all teams play A.
Proof. It suces to prove that " dominates ", i.e. "(~ A)  "(~ A): This follows from equation
(17), i.e. the event that Z"
1 = (M) implies the event that S "
1 = (N). 
3.2 Contagion versus State Dependent Mutation
This subsection presents the main result of the paper. Our main goal is to demonstrate that for
any state dependent mutation satisfying the conditions in Assumption 1, contagion dominates
mutation: given a mutation structure, the risk dominant equilibrium will be uniquely selected
in the long run for a large but ﬁnite population.
The proof is built around two important concepts.
Deﬁnition 1 (Lock-in) A state Z is called a lock-in if no team changes strategy in the absence
of mutation. The set of these states is denoted by L.
If strategy A does not spread further through contagion, then the state is a lock-in.5 The next
concept is new.
5This state is also called limit sets of the mutationless process in the literature.
10Deﬁnition 2 (k-restricted lock-in) Draw an MM square representation of the torus. Denote
the ”left-upper” k  k square by R(k). Deﬁne the restriction of Z to R(k) to be a state where all
teams inside R(k) play the strategy according to Z while all teams outside R(k) play B. If the
restriction of Z to R(k) is a lock-in, then Z is called a k-restricted lock-in. The set of k-restricted
lock-ins is denoted by Lk.
Put dierently, we treat all teams outside R(k) as if they play B. If no team ever adopts A
inside R(k) due to contagion, then Z 2 Lk. The deﬁnition describes the set of states where the
conﬁguration outside R(k) does not generate contagion,6 i.e. there are no contagious eects
coming from outside R(k). It is easy to see that a k-restricted lock-in is also an l-restricted
lock-in for all l < k. Although a restricted lock-in is not necessarily a lock-in, any lock-in Z is
a k-restricted lock-in for all k < M.
We start by proving a prepartory lemma. Let LA
k be the set of k-restricted lock-ins with all
teams in R(k) playing A. Moreover, let Zk be the set of conﬁgurations where at least k teams in
R(k) play B.
Lemma 2 IfZ 2 L ~ A, thenZ 2 ZM, i.e. itcontainsatleast M teamsplaying B. IfZ 2 Lk LA
k,
then Z 2 Zk, i.e. it contains at least k teams playing B.
Proof. Consider the statement for lock-ins. Observe that it is sucient for the whole population
to adopt A in the absence of mutation if at least M teams play A at t = 0 and these teams are
located on a diagonal. It is easy to see that all teams next to the diagonal have two neighbors
in two dierent coordinate direction playing A. Therefore these teams adopt A by lemma 1.
Applying induction, we obtain that all teams adopt A at t = M   1.
Next, suppose that at most M   1 teams play B initially. To see that such a conﬁguration
cannot be a lock-in, note that a torus of size M  M can be viewed as an object consisting of M
paralel diagonals of length M. If at most M  1 teams play B at t = 0, there must be at least one
diagonal on the torus on which all teams play A. Hence our previous argument implies that the
the whole population adopts A which proves the ﬁrst part of our lemma.
Now consider the statement for k-restricted lock-ins. Since a k-restricted lock-in is not
a torus but a square which cannot be viewed as an object consisting of paralel diagonals, the
previousargument cannotbe applieddirectly. However, aredeﬁnition ofthe concept“diagonal”
forsquaressolvesourproblem. ViewR(k)asconsistingofanupperandalowertriangleplusthe
main diagonal. Pick up a diagonal of length n1 from the upper triangle and the corresponding
6To ensure that the teams at the boundary of the M  M square have a regular neighborhood structure, we
assume that there is an (M + 1)st row and column of teams all playing B for all t  0.
11diagonal of length n2 = k n1 from the lower triangle. Let a “diagonal” be deﬁned by these two
pieces. The k   1 such a “diagonal” plus the main diagonal gives us k “diagonals”. Elementary
argument shows that if any of the construced diagonals contains k teams playing A, all teams in
R(k) eventually adopt A in the absence of mutation. Therefore our previous argument applies
proving the second part of the lemma. 
These two results are a very when we need to know the minumum number of mutations required
to leave the basin of attraction of ~ A or a k-restricted lock-in with all teams in R(k) playing A.
After this preparaton, we shall characterize the limit distribution of the process fZ"
t g using a
result on ﬁrst passage times. First, we introduce some notation. Let Z and Z0 be two states of
fZ"
t g and TZ = infft > 0 : Z"
t = Zg be the ﬁrst passage time to state Z. Let
Pr Z(Z
"
t = Z
0)  Pr(Z
"
t = Z
0jZ
"
0 = Z):
and
Pr Z(E) = inf
Z2Z
Pr Z(E)
for an event E and Z  (M). We use the following well-known identity for ergodic Markov-
processes [see Durrett (1996, Chapter 5)].
"(Z)
"(~ A)
=
Pr ~ A

TZ < T~ A

Pr Z

T~ A < TZ
 (18)
We estimate the numerator and denominator separately. The key is to estimate the latter.
Now we turn to the proof for the main theorem which is constructed via three lemmas.
Although they are somewhat technical, we believe that there is a clear intuition behind each
of these lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma establishes the order of the probability of getting from one
lock-in to another one which has less teams playing A.
Lemma 3 Let Z and Z0 be two lock-ins with Z * Z0. The probability of getting from lock-in Z
to lock-in Z0 without hitting any other lock-in is given by
Pr Z(TZ0 < TL Z0) = O("
¯ (A)jZnZ0j): (19)
Proof. We estimate the following sum
Pr Z(TZ0 < TL Z0) =
1 X
t=1
Pr Z(TZ0 = t;TL Z0 > t):
12First, observe that for any t, the event fTZ0 = t;TL Z0 > tg requires that the process leaves Z
in the ﬁrst period since Z 2 L   Z0. Next, if the process leaves Z, at least one team adopts A
in every period due to contagion until the next lock-in is reached. Since the process may hit ~ A
at time t = M2, we need at least maxft   M2;0g mutations to B not to hit a lock-in by time t.
Moreover, since Z * Z0 and transition from A to B is not possible without mutation, we need
at least jZnZ0j more mutations to B to reach Z0. Thus, reaching Z0 by time t without hitting any
other lock-in along a given trajectory has probability at most "¯ (B)(jZj jZ0j+maxft M2;0g). We have
to multiply this value with the number of possible trajectories. Since each trajectory is t long,
choosing a suciently large K depending only on M, we can estimate this number by Kt.7 For
" suciently small, the sum in the inequality
Pr Z(TZ0 < TL Z0)  "
¯ (B)(jZnZ0j)
1 X
t=1
K
t"
¯ (B)maxft M2;0g:
is convergent. Indeed the sum is O(1) which proves our claim. 
Note that any conﬁguration with less then M teams playing B (other then ~ A) is not a lock-in by
Lemma 2. Therefore this lemma also implies that if the process starts from ~ A, the probability
that ithits anyconﬁguration withat least M teams playing Bbefore gettingback to ~ A is bounded
from above by K"¯ (A)M.
The next lemma formulates a “local” version of this observation. This local version will
make it possible to track the evolution of the process more closely and in the end prove our
main claim.
Lemma 4 We have that
Pr LA
k

TZk < TLA
k

 K"
¯ (B)k (20)
for some K > 0 independent of ".
Proof. The proof is based on the construction of a shadow process Z
k;"
t , which is intended to
keep track of only those events taking place inside of R(k). We prove the claim for the shadow
process making use of the previous lemma and then we transform the result to Z"
t by using
coupling argument.
First we construct the shadow process as follows. At the initial state, teams inside R(k) in
Z
k;"
0 play the same strategy they play in Z"
0. However, teams outside R(k) in Z
k;"
0 play B. This is
to ensure that we focus only on the “local problem”, i.e. what happens inside R(k). We deﬁne
7Dierent K’s appearing in dierent formulas may be dierent.
13the transition rule as follows. Teams inside R(k) in Z
k;"
t mutate to a given strategy if they do so
inside R(k) in Z"
t . Contagion within R(k) in Z
k;"
t takes place according to the standard rule for
teams. Finally, teams outside R(k) in Z
k;"
t play B forever.
It is easy to see that Z
k;"
t  Z"
t for all t  0. It is true for t = 0 by construction. Since no
team ever plays A outside R(k) in Z
k;"
t , we only have to show that our claim is true inside R(k).
First, mutation generates teams playing A under Z
k;"
t whenever it does R(k) under Z"
t . Secondly,
since contagion is induced only by A and teams outside R(k) play B forever, teams outside R(k)
have no contagious eects on teams inside R(k) in Z
k;"
t . Since this is not true for Z"
t , we have
Z
k;"
t  Z"
t .
Consider now the shadow process Z
k;"
t . Lemma 2 and 3 imply for the shadow process that
the probability of getting to Zk before returning to LA
k is bounded from above by K"¯ (B)k.8
Condition Z
k;"
t  Z"
t implies that if Z"
t hits Zk so does Z
k;"
t , and conversely if Z
k;"
t returns to LA
k
so does Z"
t . Thus if the required inequality holds for Z
k;"
t it also holds for Z"
t . The lemma is
proved. 
The next lemma builds on the previous two lemmas to provide the key to the proof of our
main claim.
Lemma 5 Let
m 
&
¯ (A)
¯ (B)
'
: (21)
where d:e is the smallest integer greater than the term inside. For all M > m
1
Pr Z

T~ A < TZ
 = O("
¯ (A)m) (22)
for any Z 2 L   ~ A.
Proof. We construct an event which is a subset of the event fT~ A < TZg, and estimate its proba-
bility from below. The key step of the proof is to show that once all teams in R(k) play A with
k  m, there is a positive probability independent of ", that all teams in R(k + 1) will play A
before returning to Z. Thus m plays the role of a critical mass; once a suciently large set of
teams (measured by m) is conquered by strategy A, it is easy to proceed. So the diculty lies
in reaching this critical mass of m, and hence the bound "¯ (A)m.
Since Z 2 L  ~ A, it follows from lemma 2 that it contains at least M teams playing B. Draw
a MM square representation of the torus such that the uppermost and leftmost team plays B in
8Note that from the point of view of the shadow process the set LA
k could be considered to be a singleton since
teams outside R(k) do not count anyway.
14Z. Denote the “left upper” k  k square in this M  M torus by R(k), and the diagonal elements
by D(k). Observe that this construction ensures that Z 2 Lk   LA
k for all k = m;:::; M which
implies by lemma 2 that Z 2 Zk for all k = m;:::; M.
To estimate Pr Z

T~ A < TZ

from below, consider the following inequality:
Pr Z

T~ A < TZ

 Pr Z

TLA
m < TZ
 M 1 Y
k=m
Pr LA
k

TLA
k+1 < TZk

: (23)
To see why this inequality holds, ﬁrst note that LA
M = ~ A. Next observe that the ﬁrst term is the
probability that the process visits an m-restricted lock-in where all teams in R(m) play A before
getting back to Z. The second term is the product of probabilities. Each term in this product
measures the probability that the process passes from a k-restricted lock-in to a k + 1-restricted
lock-in without hitting Zk. Along such a path the process does not hit Z because Z 2 Zk for all
k = m;:::; M. Since this chain of events is sucient but not necessary for
n
T~ A < TZ
o
to occur,
its probability is a lower bound on Pr Z

T~ A < TZ

. Thus the inequality indeed holds.
We now turn to estimate each term on the right hand side of the above inequality separately.
We shall complete this estimation in two steps.
Step1. Supposethatatleasttheteamsin D(m)mutateto Aintheinitialperiodandnomutations
to B take place during the next m periods. Lemma 1 implies that all teams in R(m) play A after
at most m periods, and we have not returned to Z. Thus
Pr Z

TLA
m < TZ

 K1"
¯ (A)m (24)
for some K1 > 0 and " small.
Step 2. We prove now that the probability of getting from LA
k to LA
k+1 without hitting Zk is
bounded from below by a constant independently of ". To ﬁnd this bound we recycle our
construction of the shadow process from the previous lemma to construct an event which is a
subset of
n
TLA
k+1 < T ¯ LA
k
o
.
Let ˜ Ti
Z be the ith hitting times of the shadow process Z
k;"
t on some subset Z of the M  M
15representation of the torus. Consider the following inequality:
Pr LA
k

TLA
k+1 < TZk


1 X
i=1
Pr LA
k

˜ T
i
LA
k
< ˜ TZk

 Pr
 
The team in D(k + 1)=D(k) does not mutate to A in Z"
t for the ﬁrst
(i  1) times when Z
k;"
t hits LA
k, but it does at the i times.
!
 Pr

No mutation to B occurs in (M) for k + 1 periods

:
The right hand side captures the following event. The shadow process starting from LA
k returns
to LA
k several times without hitting Zk. One of these times the next team along the diagonal
mutates to A. Finally, no mutation takes place for the next k + 1 periods after that. We can
write the probability of this joint event in a product form because of the Markov property and
because the shadow process is independent of what mutations take place outside R(k) in Z"
t .
If that this joint event happens, then all teams in R(k) play A in Z"
t and Z"
t did not hit Zk on
the way because Z
k;"
t  Z"
t by construction. Since the next team along the diagonal mutated to
A, and no mutations happened afterwards for k+1 periods, contagion drove all teams in R(k+1)
to play A in the end. Therefore the probability of this joint event is indeed a lower bound for
the right-hand side.
We estimate each terms on the right hand side separately. The strong Markov property of
the stopping times ˜ Ti
LA
k
, i = 1;2;::: and Lemma 4 imply for the ﬁrst event on the right hand
side that
Pr LA
k

˜ T
i
LA
k
< ˜ TZk



1   K"
¯ (B)ki


1   K"
¯ (A)i
;
where we used the fact that ¯ (A)  ¯ (B)k for all k  m by construction. The the second term
equals to

1   "¯ (A)i 1
"¯ (A). Finally, the probability of the third term, i.e. no team mutates to B
for k + 1 periods is bounded from below by

1   "¯ (B)M2(k+1)
.
Putting these three pieces together yields
Pr LA
k

TLA
k+1 < TZk


1 X
i=1

1   K"
¯ (A)i 
1   "
¯ (A)i 1
"
¯ (A) 
1   "
¯ (B)M2(k+1)
= "
¯ (A)(1   "
¯ (B))
M2(k+1) 1   K"¯ (A)
K"¯ (A) + "¯ (A)   K"2¯ (A)
 "
¯ (A)(1   "
¯ (B))
M2(k+1) 1   K"¯ (A)
(1 + K)"¯ (A)  K2: (25)
for some K2 > 0 independent of ". The second step is complete.
Putting the results from equation (24) and (25) together proves the lemma. 
16The heart of the previous lemma is step 2 where we assess the outcome of a “race”: the next
diagonal team to mutates to A before too many teams at wrong locations inside R(k) mutate
to B. The probability of the event that the next diagonal team mutates to A at each occasion
when all teams play A inside R(k) is "¯ (A). The probability of the event that the process hits
a k-restricted lock-in with positive number of teams playing B in R(k) is at most K"¯ (B)k. The
fact that the ratio of these two probabilities is bounded from below by a constant for k  m
implies that the set of teams playing A has a strong growth property for small ". This is due
to two factors. One is cohesion: once a large group of teams play A, it is very hard to destroy
them. Secondly, contagion ensures that only one additional team is required for the large group
playing A to grow beyond its boundaries. Intuitively, m acts as a “critical mass” in the argument;
once the teams in R(m) play A, the critical mass has been reached and it is easy to proceed.
The next theorem states our main result.
Theorem 1 For M  m
lim
"!0
"(~ A) = 1;
where m is deﬁned in (21).
Proof. We prove our claim in two steps. The ﬁrst step focuses on Z 2 L  ~ A whereas the second
step considers Z < L.
Step 1. Consider the states Z 2 L   ~ A. We have that
"(Z)
"(~ A)
=
PA(TZ < TA)
PZ(TA < TZ)
:
The previous lemma implies
1
PZ(TA < TZ)
= O

"
 ¯ (A)m
for M  m.
Since Z is a lock-in and Z , ~ A, Z has at least M teams playing B. It follows from Lemma 3
that
PA(TZ < TA) = O

"
¯ (B)M
:
Indeed, starting from ~ A, the ﬁrst lock-in on the way requires at least M mutations to B. Putting
these together yields
"(Z)
"(~ A)
= O

"
¯ (B)M ¯ (A)m
:
17In particular, for M  m,
"(Z)
"(~ A)
! 0
as " ! 0.
Step 2. Consider the states Z < L. Let ˆ Z be the state to which Z converges in the absence of
mutations. Then
"(Z)
"(ˆ Z)
=
Pˆ Z(TZ < T ˆ Z)
PZ(T ˆ Z < TZ)
:
The denominator is of order 1, because if no mutation occurs for the next M2 periods (which
happenswithprobabilityapproaching1)thenwehit ˆ Z withouthittingZ forsure. Thenumerator
goes to zero as " ! 0 because of our Assumption 1. Indeed, a mutation is required in the ﬁrst
step, otherwise we would stay at ˆ Z. The aforementioned condition guarantees that all mutation
probabilities tend to zero.
Therefore
"(Z)
"(ˆ Z)
! 0
as " ! 0. This holds true for ˆ Z = ~ A as well as other lock-ins. All in all we have that
"(Z)
"(~ A)
! 0
for any Z such that Z , ~ A. The proof is complete. 
Putting together this result and Proposition 2 yields that for N  2M even, the only long-run
stochastically stable set of the original fS "
tgt0 process is ~ A.
It remains to consider the situation when N is odd. Let N = 2M +1. Consider a a 2M 2M
rectangle on the torus. Note that throughout the proofs so far we have not used the fact that
the environment is a torus, and not an M  M square. Thus the theorem is applicable for the
2M 2M square on the torus. Note that if all teams in the 2M 2M square are playing A, then
contagion in the absence of mutation implies that the (2M +1)st column and row will also play
A in a ﬁnite time period. Since mutation probabilities go to zero, we can conclude that ~ A is the
only long-run stochastically stable set of the game for N = 2M + 1 too. Thus the following
corollary holds.
Corollary 1 For N  2m we have
lim
"!0
"(~ A) = 1
where m is deﬁned in (21), and " is the unique invariant distribution of S "
t.
184 Conclusion
In contrast to the crucial role of the state dependent mutation in the equilibrium selection for
global interaction games, the detail of mutation structure does not matter much for the local
interaction games. The result strengthens the equilibrium selection result of the evolutionary
game theory. Moreover it justiﬁes the approach which deliberately avoids a detailed formu-
lation of the decision making process. Finally considering the fact that the situation captured
by the approach is mainly social phenomena involving many loosely related agents, the local
interaction framework could be a better description than the global interaction framework.
Our result can be regarded as a generalization of Ellison’s (2000) step-by-step evolution
approach to identify the long run stochastically stable set in a local interaction setting. His
approach relies on the concepts of radius and modiﬁed coradius to characterize the evolution
toward the limit set. The radius measures how easy to leave the basin of attraction of the limit
set. The modiﬁed coradius measures how dicult to get into the basin of attraction of the limit
set. In particular, computing the modiﬁed coradius involves to count the number of mutations
required for the process to leave the basin of attractions of intermediate limit sets (lock-ins in
our terminology). The modiﬁed coradius captures the idea that what matters on the long run is
how the process gets from one lock-in to the next before reaching the the long run stochastically
stable set of a model. However, it is not easy to extend the radius-modiﬁed coradius argument to
the case of state dependent mutations. The complications comes from the fact that if mutations
are state dependent, then it matters through which type of mutations the process leaves the basin
of attraction of an intermediate limit set. It is much more complicated to estimate the coradius
of an intermediate limit set unless the limit set has a regular shape, for example, it is a rectangle.
Therefore, we decided to construct a direct proof of our claim.
Our proof builds on the idea that we can characterize the evolution by looking at how the
process passes through conﬁgurations which are locally regular, i.e. they contain a connected
island, a square of players playing A. These are our restricted lock-ins. We show that we can
abstract away how the conﬁguration looks outside such a square, and that we can focus on how
the process evolves step-by-step from one square of players playing A to the next larger square
until the whole population plays A.
The argument for our main result can be extended to a more general setting with a higher
dimension, a larger interaction range and many strategies. Using results from Blume (1995),
one can construct stable teams for more general interaction ranges. Since contagion also works
in a similar fashion as in our case, the argument of our proof applicable. Furthermore, higher
19dimensional environment also allows the construction of teams, and the arguments of Schon-
mann (1992) imply that the contagion mechanism works in the same way, so our proof can be
applied. Finally, if we consider many strategies, but there is a unique strategy A such that it is
best response to any conﬁguration where at least half of the opponents play A, then stable teams
can be constructed, and our proof can be applied.
We can also draw some conclusion about the relationship between mutation and contagion
in a more general local interaction environment than the torus; see Morris (2000) and Young
(1998, Chapter 6). The existence of cohesive groups and the contagion mechanism is essential
for our argument to work. If both cohesion and contagion favors strategy A, the intuition behind
our result implies that the number of mutation required to eliminate a large group playing A will
depend on the size of the group. In contrast, to propagate strategy A through contagion requires
few strategies independent of the population size. This asymmetry would ensure that results on
state-dependent mutation similar to ours can be obtained in a more general spatial environment.
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